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  The 1930s witnessed Britain’s first major boom in working-class owner-
occupation. Purchasers typically came from cramped, rented, inner-urban 
accommodation, and, only a few years previously, would not have considered the 
possibility of buying a new house. Such perceptions were transformed by an 
aggressive marketing campaign by the building societies and building industry, to 
create a new mass market for owner-occupation. During the 1930s they developed a 
number of extremely sophisticated marketing strategies, including strong elements of 
`lifestyle marketing’, to transform the popular image of a mortgage from `a millstone 
round your neck’ to a key element of a new, suburbanized, aspirational lifestyle. This 
both contributed to the fastest rate of growth in working-class owner-occupation 
during the twentieth century and had a substantial impact on consumption patterns for 
families who moved to the new estates. 
After briefly discussing the causes and dimensions of the housing boom 
and the extent of working-class participation, this article examines the 
marketing campaigns launched by the building societies and the building 
industry to entice working-class customers. The analysis draws both on supply-
side evidence - advertising material and business archives - and demand-side 
data – a qualitative database of 58 accounts by working-class people who 
moved into owner-occupation during this period, assembled from oral history 
  1archives, published and unpublished autobiographies, and other sources 
(hereafter Life Histories Database) together with a quantitative database of 
working-class family budgets.
ii The paper also examines the ways in which 
opportunistic marketing contributed to an eventual crisis in the sector. 
 
The 1930s owner-occupation boom 
 
The emergence of owner-occupation as a significant tenure in Britain is 
essentially a post-First World War phenomenon. It has been estimated that only 
around 10 per cent of Britain’s 1914 housing stock was owner-occupied, less than one 
per cent was municipally-owned, and around 90 per cent was rented out by private 
landlords.
iii The social status of owner-occupiers was broad, ranging from the very 
rich to skilled and semi-skilled workers such as coal miners. Yet working-class 
owner-occupation was highly localised in relatively few manufacturing and mining 
districts in the north and midlands and was virtually unknown in most areas
iv
Socio-economic changes during the First World War and interwar years were 
to transform Britain’s tenure pattern. The war-time introduction of rent control led to 
a rapid decline in private renting, council housing emerged as a major source of new 
houses during the 1920s, and owner-occupation experienced a more than three-fold 
increase by 1938. On the eve of the Second World War some 32 per cent of the 
nation’s housing stock was estimated to be owner-occupied, ten per cent owned by 
local authorities, and 58 per cent privately-rented (an estimated 1.1 million privately-
rented houses having been sold to owner-occupiers).
v  
Sales of privately-rented houses to tenants were concentrated during the 
1920s. As these were mainly older-style terraced properties, lacking bathrooms and 
  2modern utilities, often in a less than perfect state of repair and, crucially, subject to 
rent control, prices were generally low - making them affordable to tenants who could 
not have considered purchasing a modern house. There were cases of working-class 
people buying new houses, though these were uncommon. The overall growth of 
working-class owner-occupation remained modest; while no national figures are 
available, a review of fragmentary local evidence by George Speight concluded that a 
working-class owner-occupation rate of eight or nine per cent before 1932 would be 
an upper-bound estimate.
vi
  The 1930s witnessed a much more rapid expansion in owner-occupation, in 
which the working-class played a substantial role in the market for new (rather than 
second-hand) houses for the first time.
vii A major Ministry of Labour household 
expenditure survey indicated that by 1937/8 around 17.8 per cent of non-agricultural 
working-class households either owned, or were purchasing, their own homes.
viii Thus 
the proportion of working-class owner-occupiers had at least doubled over the space 
of a few years. Owner-occupation, and particularly house purchase via mortgage (as 
opposed to outright ownership, typically through inheritance) was concentrated in the 
relatively prosperous south and midlands. Depression and mass unemployment in the 
heavy industry regions of northern and western Britain eroded the stability of 
employment necessary to take on a mortgage, while out-migration to more prosperous 
regions reduced the pressure of housing demand. While owner-occupation rates rose 
with earnings, as Table One Shows they were substantial for a broad spectrum of 
working-class incomes – reaching 12.3 per cent even for households with a weekly 
expenditure of 50-60 shillings (compared to a non-agricultural working-class 
household average of 85 shillings).
ix
  3The 1930s’ housing boom mainly involved new properties; of 38 accounts in 
the Life histories Database, involving houses known to have been purchased during 
this decade, no fewer than 34 were new developments.
x New houses were particularly  
Table 1: The proportion of non-agricultural working-class households buying/owning 
their own home at various levels of weekly expenditure, October 1937 – July 1938 
 
Total weekly expenditure (s)
 
% of households in class 
buying/owning their home 















Source: NA, LAB17/7, “Weekly expenditure of working-class households in the 
United Kingdom in 1937-38,” unpublished report, Ministry of Labour and National 
Service, July 1949. 
 
Notes: The average weekly household income recorded by the Survey was 85s (with 
an average of 1.75 wage earners per household). 
 
attractive to purchasers, as they were typically very different in character to pre-1914 
accommodation. The 1918 Tudor Walters report on the standards of post-war local 
authority housing set a new standard for working-class homes, involving lower 
densities than traditional inner-urban accommodation (not more than 12 per acre, built 
semi-detached or in short terraces), with bathrooms, wide frontages to increase natural 
daylight, and a cottage appearance enhanced by front and rear gardens.
xi The building 
of several hundred thousand council houses on this blueprint during the 1920s 
  4contributed to the rapid technical obsolescence of pre-war terraces lacking bathrooms, 
other modern utilities, and gardens. Private developers of cheap owner-occupied 
housing typically adopted the Tudor Walters standard, while often building at lower 
densities (eight to ten houses per acre) and including various largely cosmetic 
features, discussed below, together with `aspirational’ marketing to distinguish their 
estates from council houses. Low densities were achieved by locating estates on 
cheaper land beyond traditional urban boundaries, taking advantage of new transport 
developments that increased workers’ mobility. These semi-rural locations proved 
very popular and rapidly became a desirable feature of working-class housing. 
 
Making houses affordable – the introduction of `easy terms’ 
 
During the 1930s the number of private-sector houses built in Britain reached 
an all-time peak.
xii One necessary, though not sufficient, condition was a steep decline 
in house prices. After rocketing in the inflationary aftermath of the First World War, 
house prices experienced a long decline  - the product of general deflation and 
particularly severe declines in building materials costs and in labour costs (due to de-
skilling and labour-saving innovations in building techniques). Speculative house 
builders were particularly successful in lowering costs, through using cheaper 
materials and substituting unskilled labour on piecework for apprenticed building 
workers.
xiii A modern Tudor Walters type house had cost more than £1,000 to build in 
1920; by 1932 the same house could be built for about £350.
xiv Meanwhile there had 
been a substantial rise in real incomes (for those in employment).  
  The house price fall was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for making 
owner-occupation accessible to large numbers of working-class families; estimates 
indicate that in 1930 buying a new house would still generally have required a weekly 
  5income in excess of £4.
xv The key remaining obstacles for families earning £2 10s - 
£4 per week were the substantial minimum deposit and heavy weekly mortgage 
instalments. The reduction in interest rates during the early 1930s - following 
Britain’s departure from the Gold Standard and the government’s adoption of a cheap 
money policy - significantly reduced minimum weekly instalments, but was 
insufficient, in itself, to substantially widen accessibility. Of crucial importance was 
the action of building societies in liberalising mortgage terms so as to extend the 
socio-economic range of owner-occupiers.  
  Following the onset of cheap money, building societies were viewed as 
relatively high-interest, low-risk, savings vehicles and thus faced a heavy inflow of 
funds. As they borrowed short and lent long - at fixed interest rates – they realised 
that adopting prevailing low rates would be a risky strategy should cheap money 
should prove transitory, and thus tempered their rate reductions.
xvi Yet placing their 
burgeoning funds in mortgages proved challenging. Private landlords, a major 
traditional source of business, were still deterred by rent control and fears of future 
controls. The societies’ solution was to create a new, mass, market for owner-
occupation, by liberalising the terms on which they granted mortgages. In a 
competitive process of undercutting each other on  `easy terms’, mortgage periods 
were extended from around 20 years to 25, or even 30, years, thereby substantially 
reducing weekly payments. Meanwhile a number of devices were employed to reduce 
the minimum deposit requirement. 
House-buyers could pay a reduced deposit by taking out an insurance policy, 
paying a single premium in return for a guarantee to compensate the building society 
for any loss sustained on the sum loaned in excess of the society’s normal maximum 
ratio of mortgage to house price (generally 75 or 80 per cent).
xvii Local authorities 
  6provided similar guarantees, to help reduce local housing shortages. Yet these still 
required a minimum deposit of at least 10 per cent.
 xviii Of much greater importance 
were guarantees provided by estate developers - commonly referred to as builder’s 
pool arrangements, as guarantees were typically pooled over many properties. These 
were used to reduce deposits to around, or sometimes below, five per cent of the 
purchase cost. 
Builders pool arrangements had been known for some time, but only came 
into widespread national use during the 1930s. The developer made cash deposits 
with the society, originally equal to the difference between the society’s normal 
maximum ratio of mortgage to house price and the new ratio of 95 per cent. However, 
as competition between societies intensified, builders successfully renegotiated terms, 
lowering deposits to one third or even one quarter of this excess.
xix Government 
sources indicate that by 1938 between 40 and 60 per cent of current building society 
mortgage business was being conducted via pool schemes, with a higher proportion 
for relatively cheap properties.
xx This is corroborated by the Life Histories Database; 
purchasers of new houses during the 1930s typically reporting deposit payments of 
around 4.0 – 6.7 per cent of the purchase price, which were only available on pool 
schemes.  
Reducing deposits to around £25 or £30 played a key role in opening up 
owner-occupation to manual workers. As one building society luminary noted, 
`Innumerably more people can find a 5 per cent deposit than…10 per cent… it is 
much easier to scrape together £25 than £50 and experience has shown us that 
ingenious methods of finding a small deposit have certainly obtained.’
xxi For example, 
Grace Foakes, the wife of a London riverman, recalled that she and her husband paid 
a £1 initial deposit for a £495 house in Hornchurch, east London, hoping `with the 
  7optimism of youth’ to be able to make this up to £5 at the end of a month and to a £25 
final deposit at the end of three months. When they found themselves unable to save 
the final £20, Grace raised the balance by pawning her most valued possession - her 
mother’s gold watch and chain.
xxii Making an initial payment of £25-£30 to secure a 
property was also more in keeping with working-class expectations, as it had a 
parallel in the house rental market, `key money’ - the money landlords sometimes 
demanded for handing over the keys to accommodation.
xxiii In some cases, deposit 
requirements were reduced to below £25, through devices such as using a life 
assurance policy as additional collateral, or the developer loaning the purchaser part 
of the deposit.
xxiv   
As a result of this liberalisation of mortgage terms it became generally cheaper 
(from the perspective of weekly payments) to buy a new house on mortgage than to 
rent one.
xxv Meanwhile, as the 1930s progressed developers targeted successively 
lower income groups to further widen their market. One leading developer, Wates, 
stated that around 50-75 per cent of their 1930s houses were intended for the `steady 
working class.’
xxvi London’s most active house developer, New Ideal Homesteads, 
marketed a three bedroom terraced house, with a bathroom in the kitchen (similar in 
design to many non-parlour council houses) for £395, involving weekly mortgage 
payments of only 9 shillings and 6 pence.
xxvii On some estate these were offered 
leasehold for only £295.
xxviii Several other developers began offering houses priced 
from around £395 in London, or £350 in the provinces. By 1939 one major developer, 
Davis Estates, was beginning to develop houses aimed at unskilled workers earning 
£2-£3 a week and priced at around £330.
xxix Many working-class families found 
themselves able to purchase houses substantially in excess of the minimum price and 
quality threshold for owner-occupation; the mean house price given in the Life 
  8Histories Database for purchases during the 1930s was £600, with a standard 
deviation of £173, while the median price was £575.
xxx  
 
The marketing process 
 
 
  Longer mortgage terms and smaller deposits made home-ownership accessible 
to a substantial section of the working-class. Yet merely because a product is 
affordable to a new mass market does not imply that large numbers of consumers will 
necessarily be prepared to purchase it. In the early 1930s owner-occupation was still 
an alien concept to most working-class families and ran contrary to entrenched 
cultural orthodoxies. It involved dealings with middle-class professionals and 
institutions and entering into complex legal contracts – activities viewed with fear and 
suspicion by many working people. The chief objection, however, was the taking on 
of a massive and very long-term debt, equivalent to perhaps two and a half to three 
years’ income. Traditional `respectable’ working-class values emphasised keeping out 
of debt, which could greatly increase the risks of falling into destitution during 
periods of hardship.
xxxi Several accounts in the Life Histories Database reflect these 
concerns, young couples being warned by friends or relatives that a mortgage was `a 
millstone round your neck’.
xxxii
A mortgage was also a much less flexible means of obtaining accommodation 
than a tenancy. There were heavy `sunk costs’ of the deposit, various transactions 
fees, and accumulated capital payments, plus a continuing legal liability to repay the 
loan (even if the house was surrendered to the building society). These made it 
difficult and expensive to switch to cheaper accommodation during periods of 
reduced income, or when a change of job required a new location. Urban working-
class families typically made frequent house moves; for example it has been estimated 
  9that before 1914 around 30-40 per cent of London’s population changed residence 
annually.
xxxiii
To overcome these cultural and practical aversions, the building industry and 
building society movement engaged in an aggressive marketing crusade to sell both 
the idea of home-ownership, and the appeal of new suburban estates, to the working 
public. Building societies undertook considerable advertising to extol the virtues of 
owner-occupation; in 1935 their adverts were estimated to account for 0.58 per cent of 
all press display advertising, equaling the combined expenditure of the banking, 
insurance, and trustee company sectors.
xxxiv Yet the building industry proved the key 
player in selling owner-occupation to a mass public; building estate companies’ direct 
advertising accounted for 1.08 per cent of press display advertising, while an 
unknown volume of additional advertising was conducted via estate agents.
xxxv  
Press advertising was used in conjunction with a range of other advertising and 
marketing media to promote a variety of sophisticated messages. Probably the most 
important concerned affordability. A barrage of advertising, including an increasing 
proportion of large, illustrated, adverts, was brought into working-class homes via 
national, regional, and local newspapers, sometimes in the form of extensive property 
supplements.
xxxvi Newspaper advertising covered a wide range of themes, though the 
`easy terms’ on which attractive, modern, houses could be purchased tended to feature 
most prominently. For example, a property advertising feature in the Bristol Evening 
News reported the slogan of one local house-builder: `”Why Pay Rent?’’ when you 
can purchase a house… for £18 deposit and from 8s 9d weekly’.
xxxvii
Roadside hoardings constituted another important advertising medium. As one 
house-buyer recalled, travelling through south-east London one encountered, `huge 
hoardings... First Wates -- £5 down secures your house. From £300 leasehold, £350 
  10freehold. Show House Open. Then… Ideal Homesteads, same kind of wording still £5 
down. These adverts were very colourful and eye catching…’
xxxviii Hoardings were 
particularly effective in alerting people to the presence of a new estate in their vicinity 
and in stressing the easy terms on which the houses were available. They proved 
successful in enticing people who were not actively seeking a house; for example, 
Jane Walsh (the wife of an Oldham cotton piecer) recalled how seeing a hoarding 
during a Saturday evening walk led to her house purchase: 
 
a big signpost… said: "Own Your Own House. Price £449. Deposit £20. 
Repayments, rates, taxes, 18s. weekly. Exhibition House now open." We 
went and had a look at the exhibition house… How we admired and 
exclaimed! We discussed ways and means of raising the £20 deposit - 
which seemed an impossible sum. And if we could raise it, what about the 
18 s rent? It would mean that I should have to go on working for years…. 
In comparison with our present rent of 6s 9.5d a week it was tremendous. 




Having attracted the customer’s initial interest through newspaper or hoarding 
advertisements, sales messages were delivered in a more elaborate form via the estate 
brochure. Brochures often ran to many pages and adopted a glossy format with large 
photographs or other good quality illustrations. They were used to convey a number 
of messages, yet easy terms again typically featured most prominently. For example, 
the front cover of a 1933 New Ideal Homesteads brochure had the slogan ‘9’6 Weekly 
£395 freehold’ – together with the illustration of a large house  (not the one available 
  11for £395).
xl Brochures and advertisements further asserted affordability by portraying 
house purchase as an investment – in effect suggesting that a mortgage made other 
long-term savings less necessary. For example, a Davis Estates brochure claimed that: 
 
The money wasted in paying rent over a period of years will surprise you 
… To invest part of your savings in the best of all securities – a home – is 
a sound policy, as your building society repayments are usually less than 
the rent demanded for similar accommodation. You are, therefore, 
acquiring your own home at no additional cost and in many cases at an 
actual saving, and making your rent pay for your house.’
 xli
 
One particularly powerful means of demonstrating affordability to a sceptical 
working-class public was by recruiting existing purchasers as agents. Several 
developers began to offer purchasers commission for introducing new customers, 
typically £5 (approximately one per cent of the purchaser price). Ivy Willis recalled 
that her husband, a postal sorter, introduced about eight or nine buyers to their 
developer, earning around £40-£45 `which was a lot to us in our day.'
xlii This practice 
appears to have been an important source of customers for at least some estates, for 
example, W. H. Wedlock claimed that, ‘80% of our Sales are through the direct 
recommendation of our satisfied purchasers.’
xliii
Another aspect of `easy terms’ was simplifying the purchase process. This had 
traditionally involved dealings with building societies, solicitors, and estate agents, 
which both mystified and intimidated many working people and incurred substantial 
transactions fees that increased up-front costs. Developers began to offer an `all-in’ 
product, that included arranging the mortgage and incorporating legal and other fees 
  12into the house price and, therefore, the mortgage. As one purchaser recalled, `The 
office did all the paper work, all you did was sign a paper or two.
 xliv It was also 
common for developers to reduce `moving-in’ costs by installing wallpaper and 
fittings for free, the purchaser being allowed to choose from a range of designs. Some 
even offered free furniture removal over a certain distance.
xlv  
   
 
Marketing the house-search process as a leisure activity 
 
While newspaper and hoarding adverts might arouse a purchaser’s initial 
curiosity, the building estate was the crucial venue where this was turned into a firm 
commitment to purchase. People were drawn to viewing new estates through a 
marketing strategy which portrayed estate visits as a leisure activity. Sometimes the 
initial `day-out’ took place at a venue other than the estate, such as the Daily Mail 
Ideal Home Exhibition, or one the various local and regional exhibitions that 
promoted houses and their furnishings. For example the North London Exhibition 
boasted two miles of stands, covering `every aspect of progress in the planning, 
building, equipping, furnishing, and running of the home’ and drew large audiences 
with gimmicks such as the presence of famous radio stars.
xlvi Some London 
developers had their own permanent exhibitions, in the form of centrally-located show 
houses. By 1934 Davis Estates had established a show house adjacent to Charring 
Cross Station to attract buyers to its various estates in London’s suburbs and satellite 
towns.
xlvii In the same year Laings opened a show house in the forecourt of London’s 
Kings Cross Station, which was claimed to have attracted over 70,000 visitors in 
around its first three years.
xlviii This was later supplemented by a more ambitious 
`New Homes Exhibition’ in Oxford Street, hosting three full-size show houses.
xlix  
  13Promotional material emphasised a low-pressure sales approach. Laings told 
prospective viewers that,  ‘The attendants are “helpers” rather than salesmen, and will 
be pleased to show you round and give the fullest information regarding Laing 
Estates, Laing Houses and Laing House Purchase. If after inspection you desire to 
visit an Estate, a car is at your service without obligation.’
l Similarly, a New Ideal 
Homesteads brochure claimed, ‘You will not be pressed in any way, or worried to 
buy, but you will be met with a spirit of helpfulness, actuated by a desire to give you 
the fullest information on any subject dealing with houses and their cost’.
li This 
removal of any perceived obligation to purchase was crucial to the presentation of 
estate visits as a leisure activity. It followed successful practice in retailing, pioneered 
by department stores and extended to the British working-class market by the interwar 
`variety stores’ such as Woolworths and Marks & Spencer.
lii Opening hours that 
included Sundays and evenings further increased the leisure appeal of an exhibition or 
estate visit. 
  A chauffer-driven car was generally offered for at least the customer’s first 
visit to an estate. At a time when very few working-class people owned cars, this was 
a considerable novelty and helped to emphasise the aspirational nature of owner-
occupation. Estates often provided further entertainment, such as firework displays, 
concerts, visits from politicians, and launch events with film or radio stars in 
attendance.
 liii Several accounts in the Life Histories Database mention the fairground 
atmosphere of the estate visit, that was intended only as a day out but resulted their 
becoming home-owners. For example, Grace Foakes recalled that before inspecting 
the real show house, she and her husband were invited to a novelty show house:  
 
  14which was a representation of Snow White's House… together with seven 
dwarfs and Snow White… shaking hands and escorting you around. This 
was a very good sales gimmick, for after you had seen the house you were 
given a wonderful tea. When this was finished you were driven around the 
estate and invited to choose your plot of land or your house.
liv
 
Developers generally built one show house for each basic `model’ of house 
available on the estate, one sometimes doubling as a sales office. In addition to 
illustrating the different models of house on offer this also allowed the developer to 
gauge the level of likely demand for each design and the popularity of proposed lay-
outs for areas such as kitchens and bathrooms. After showing prospective purchasers 
around the estate and getting them to select the style of house and building plot they 
most liked, the salesman asked for an `initial deposit’ to secure their chosen property - 
typically £5, but in many cases only £1. By asking for a sum that was small enough 
for the customer to be able to pay on the day of the viewing, but large enough to make 
them feel committed to the transaction, the salesman was able to close the deal at the 
end of the sales pitch and avoid any `cooling off’ period. The balance of the deposit, 
typically £20-£25, was not generally required until the customer took possession 
(though in some cases an intermediate deposit of £5-£10 was due after a week or so). 
If the customer failed to find the balance, the builder would often offer it them a loan 
– as the deposit amounted to only five per cent of the sales price, and developers’ 




  15  In addition to making the purchase process simple and enjoyable, and 
emphasising the affordability of the product, marketing campaigns also sought to 
attach specific values to owner-occupation and living on modern, suburban, estates. In 
doing so, they pioneered an aspirational sales-pitch, which was to become an enduring 
feature of housing estate marketing.
lv Developers both tapped into a new, aspirational, 
family- and home-centred model of working class respectability and played an 
important role in promulgating this model, selling a `suburban dream’ that had 
hitherto been beyond the reach of the working-classes.  
  As Susan Strasser has noted, effective marketing campaigns generally 
encouraged new needs and habits, `not by creating them out of whole cloth, but by 
linking the rapid appearance of new products with the rapid changes in all areas of 
social and cultural life.’
lvi This period witnessed the diffusion of a powerful `ideology 
of domesticity’, which had begun to reach a substantial section of the working-class 
by the 1930s, promoted through the new mass-circulation women’s magazines, 
women’s sections in national newspapers, other media, health professionals, the Ideal 
Home Exhibition (and its local and regional counterparts), and advertisements for new 
consumer durables.
lvii  These idealised the married woman’s role as `professional 
housewife’, providing a happy, clean, home environment for her family via the use of 
labour saving devices and efficient household management practices.
lviii Such values 
are strongly reflected among the Life Histories Database accounts, when discussing 
motives behind moves to owner-occupied suburbia. Yet traditionally there had been 
no strong social kudos from owner-occupation, or social stigma attached to renting, as 
demonstrated by the broad social composition of tenants prior to 1914.
lix It was during 
the interwar years that owner-occupation came to be perceived as a markedly superior 
  16tenure – due, at least in part, to a concerted effort by the building industry to imbue it 
with a new symbolic meaning. 
Aspirational values were a key motif of much building society advertising, 
which linked owner-occupation with citizenship, domesticity, and a healthy, secure, 
and more prosperous future for one’s family.
lx For example, in around 1937 the 
National Association of Building Societies published Members of Parliament in 
Praise of Building Societies, a collection of endorsements from 47 MP’s including the 
Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and several cabinet ministers. A typical contribution 
was that of Col. R. V. K. Applin: 
 
Is there any form of enterprise which has done so much for our people or 
which has been so truly a national service as the work of the Building 
Societies? The man who owns his home has rooted himself in the very 
soil of his country: he is a productive citizen, with all his interests centred 
in the land. He has staked out his claim, settled his future, and is an asset 
in the national life, a worthy ‘citizen of no mean empire’.
lxi
 
Many aspirational features of the modern house – enhanced hygiene via the 
provision of a bathroom, inside toilet, and hot running water; electricity and other 
modern utilities; light, generously fenestrated rooms; front and rear gardens; and a 
suburban location - were shared by both owner-occupied and council houses. Yet 
developers of owner-occupied houses successfully distinguished their estates via 
various (often largely cosmetic) design features, aspirational street and estate names, 
and using advertising copy to assert a superior status. As a social survey of Oxford 
noted: `speculative builders pander to the weaknesses of human beings to be exclusive 
  17and are erecting a type of house which, by its appearance, will distinguish its 
inhabitants from those of the council houses.’
lxii Similarly, a survey of the London 
County Council’s Watling estate noted tenant out-migration to owner-occupied 
estates, where, despite the houses being of no better building quality, the developer 
had succeeded in inculcating a sense of superior social status.
lxiii
Developers used features such as bays, half-timbering, leaded windows, and 
similar ornamentation to create the characteristic mock-tudor semi, that drew on the 
popular English vernacular architectural tradition and became widely associated with 
superior status – in contrast to the grimly-uniform neo-Georgain facades of local 
authority estates. Rendering and half-timbering also allowed developers to cover up 
poor brickwork (by non-apprenticed workers) and cheap bricks – sometimes better 
quality bricks were left exposed at the corners to give a spurious impression of good 
quality. Private developers also created a more aspirational environment by mixing 
different styles of houses on the same street to produce a more natural streetscape, 
again in contrast to the planned collectivity of municipal estates.
lxiv  
Building society advertising emphasised the status pretensions of owner-
occupation, posters generally showing large detached villas, despite the fact that 
smaller suburban `semis’ formed the backbone of the market.
lxv Building estate 
advertising followed a similar strategy, often showing the largest type of house 
available on the estate, though such houses would typically account for only a small 
proportion of sales. Depicting a higher social setting than that of the target customer 
was a general characteristic of contemporary advertising - on both sides of the 
Atlantic - based on the premise that people preferred to identify with portrayals of 
themselves as they aspired to be rather than as they currently were.
lxvi
  18Perceptions of the social superiority of owner-occupation emerge strongly 
from the Life Histories Database. As Ivy Willis recalled, part of the motivation behind 
her house purchase was, `bettering ourselves, a sort of one-upmanship from living in 
rented accommodation... council houses were rather looked down on'.
lxvii Similarly, 
Ken Milne recalled that, `we felt we'd come up in the world as we'd got our own little 
house and I think there was a tendency for people to keep the places smarter, the 
gardens were more obvious and they were usually well-kept and the houses were 
painted up, keeping up with the Jones's’.
lxviii Developers’ advertising copy played on 
such aspirations, an extreme example being a 1935 brochure in which a two bedroom 
semi-, priced at £535, was described as having a `Tradesmen’s Side Door’.
lxix
  Developers also asserted aspirational status through emphasizing their estates’ 
rural settings and scenic beauty. This both emphasized suburbia’s advantages of clean 
air, space, and healthy living and tapped in to the contemporary upsurge in popular 
enthusiasm for the countryside - demonstrated by the growth of touring and hiking 
and fostered by the same transport improvements that made suburbia accessible to the 
working-class.
lxx In 1933, for example, New Ideal Homsesteads advertised houses 
from £395 on an estate in Barnehurst, offering: 
 
beautiful unspoiled country in the very heart of Kent… it is intended that 
this charming countryside shall permanently maintain its rural character 
and not suffer disfigurement in any way… Barnehurst enjoys all that the 
countryside has to offer, commanding entrancing views, while away to the 
North-east stretches the Thames, a silvery ribbon, winding seawards 
bringing fresh breezes which sweep across the countryside at every 
change of the tide...’
 lxxi
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`Garden-city’ estate planning ideas were also frequently emphasised. 
Morrell’s – developers of the infamous Coney Hall Estate - described their estates as, 
`vertiable gardens… so cunningly planned that every one of their delightful homes 
has the maximum fresh air and sunshine… an environment which is ideal, and far 
removed from that of the crowded streets of the cities, dangerous to the health of 
children and parents alike.’
 lxxii Brochures also frequently contained substantial 
information regarding the area’s historic heritage and access to shops, transport, local 
schools, and other amenities, to buttress their aspirational credentials.
 
  Meanwhile the house’s interior was differentiated from its municipal 
counterpart through increased emphasis on attractive fittings and `labour-saving 
devices’. The appeal was generally aimed at the housewife, in common with the 
general advertising trend towards identifying the housewife as the key player in 
household expenditure decisions
.lxxiii For example, New Ideal Homesteads marketed 
several estates with brochures entitled, The Super Home. Designed by a Woman for 
the Woman.
lxxiv Such advertising drew on the `professional housewife’ literature and 
placed particular emphasis on the kitchen as the centre of efficient household 
management. For example a 1934 Davis Estates brochure claimed that: 
 
The housewife’s needs have inspired the planning and arrangement of this 
excellent kitchen… arranged for efficient working and equipped with gas 
copper for household laundry, fitted kitchen cabinet, and enamelled 
Sentry boiler which provides constant hot water upstairs and down. The 
deep sink is of modern type with enamelled draining board. A point is 
fixed for the gas cooker… also an electric point for the iron with separate 
  20switch control. The work of cleaning has been reduced to a minimum; the 
walls are half-tiled and taps, switches and other fittings are chromium 
plated. There is an amply ventilated larder.
lxxv
 
  Meanwhile achieving the new, aspirational, lifestyle of suburban home-
owning respectability went beyond merely possessing the right house, but also 
required appropriate furnishings (at least for areas visible to visitors at the door); a 
tidy garden, good quality clothing, and neat, well-behaved, well-spoken children.
 lxxvi  
Marketing initiatives projected this coordinated lifestyle - show-houses (and their 
brochure illustrations) being dressed in matching modern furniture with 
complementary wall-paper, carpets, light-fittings, etc. Thus purchasers were offered a 
`consumer universe’ of goods rather than an isolated product.
lxxvii This image 
contrasted with the reality of the homes many owner-occupiers had moved from, 
typically furnished with an eclectic mix of new, inherited, second-hand, and home-
made furniture. Representatives of the department store that supplied the show 
house’s furnishings (commonly on loan or free of charge) were in attendance 
alongside the developer’s salesmen, while brochures provided details of where the 
furnishings could be purchased.
lxxviii It was thus possible to copy not only the show 
house’s design but its contents – which, like the house, were generally available on 
`easy’ hire (instalment) purchase terms. 
The Life Histories Database indicates that many people felt obliged to 
purchase new furniture for at least some rooms and make other adjustments to family 
budgets in order to `keep up with the Jones’s’. They describe a status system on their 
new estates based around a coordinated display of appropriate material goods and 
`restrained’ speech and behaviour, in contrast to their former inner-city communities 
  21where status was based around a broader `life portrait’ that also encompassed factors 
such as a person’s family background, occupation, and community activities.
lxxix By 
selling estates in terms of the lifestyles that accompanied them, developers played a 
significant role in initiating a trend from communities based around a shared 
background or work-place to what Boorstin has termed `consumption communities’ 
of shared material values.
lxxx
The extra costs of this new lifestyle were typically funded by cutting back on 
items of daily expenditure. Analysis of surviving budget summaries collected by the 
Ministry of Labour for its working-class household expenditure survey in April 1938 
showed that, at various levels of household expenditure, owner-occupiers not only 
spent a substantially higher proportion of income on accommodation than families 
renting their homes, but also devoted more expenditure to durable items such as 
furniture and clothing. They achieved this by squeezing spending on items of daily 
consumption, such as food, fuel and lighting; a pattern corroborated by the life history 
accounts.
lxxxi One long-term way in which the higher standards of conspicuous 
consumption could be funded, and daily spending squeezed, was by engaging in 
family limitation; analysis of available qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates 
that owner-occupiers deliberately restricted their fertility in order to control household 




Did the industry deliver what it promised? 
  
  Comparison of the marketing messages used to sell owner-occupation and the 
recollections of the 58 house-purchasers analysed for this study corroborates Gold and 
  22Gold’s finding that suburban house marketing represented neither an exact reflection 
of reality, nor a Zerrspiegel  (a fairground distorting mirror), but a mirror that selected 
and enhanced popular aspirations.
lxxxiii The great majority of purchasers were not only 
happy with their new houses, but viewed their moves from cramped, unhygienic, and 
sometimes damp and vermin-infested housing to modern suburban accommodation as 
one of the most positive and important events in their lives. They also generally 
perceived themselves to have achieved the sort of aspirational lifestyles which the 
developers’ brochures promised, as evidenced by many of their children having 
obtained jobs well beyond their own reach. For most, the `suburban dream’ promised 
in the estate brochures had become reality – if often at the cost of substantial daily 
hardships. 
Yet a few accounts reported problems of the type that eventually led the 
government into crisis measures to avert a major crash in the building society 
movement and building industry. The builders pool system contained a number of 
perverse incentives that encouraged builders to supply a low quality product to high-
risk customers, at an inflated price. Meanwhile exaggerated, misleading, or even 
fraudulent statements in developers’ marketing material led to houses being purchased 
by customers whose circumstances were not suitable for owner-occupation, or who 
were ill-prepared to face the high maintenance costs of `jerry-built’ homes. 
As Tedlow has noted, firms seeking to create mass markets require vertical 
systems to match marketing and distribution with production – something that can be 
achieved either through vertical integration or contractual relations.
lxxxiv Building 
societies were prevented from engaging in building directly by their legal status, 
while many features of the house-building market involved activities, such as 
reducing costs through the use of non-apprenticed piecework labour and cheaper 
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societies developed close contractual relations with builders via the mortgage pool 
system. Developers effectively became retail agents for the building societies, in the 
same way that hire purchase traders (who also enjoyed a dubious reputation) acted as 
retail agents for the nationally-based and much more respectable hire purchase 
finance houses.
lxxxv  
Like the finance houses, building societies relied on their retail agents for 
business. Pool arrangements constituted the only means through which societies could 
offer the 95 per cent mortgages that were key to extending the market for new houses, 
while the developer’s retail role compensated for many building societies’ limited 
branch networks. The agent relationship was formalised by commission payments 
(typically one per cent of the value of each advance) - an extension of the longer-
established practice of building societies paying commission to estate agents and 
solicitors. Builders sometimes continued to act as the society’s agent even after the 
mortgage was signed, collecting instalments from customers in arrears or, in some 
cases, from all purchasers.
lxxxvi  
Yet, as in many principal-agent situations, differences in the interests of the two 
parties produced opportunistic behaviour, that eventually threatened the stability of 
the market. One contributory factor was the scope that `easy terms’ offered 
developers to inflate prices – again mirroring practice in the market for hire purchase 
goods.
lxxxvii As an Inland Revenue official noted, `The hire purchase system applied to 
housing has the same primary features as when applied to other commodities i.e. a 
nominal deposit and easy repayment terms… focusing the mind of the purchaser on 
his periodical rather than his capital commitments’.
lxxxviii Perversely, developers used 
their pool agreements to claim that the building society’s willingness to lend 95 per 
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the absence of independent expert advice under the pool system. Building societies 
conducted their own property valuations (at the purchaser’s expense), rather than 
employing independent, qualified, valuers - a problem identified by government as a 
major flaw in the system.
lxxxix The purchaser was not given access to the valuation 
report (or even the valuation figure), despite having to pay for the valuation. 
Meanwhile the developer’s solicitor typically also acted for the purchaser and 
building society.
xc
When home-buyers came to sell their houses (without being able to offer the 95 
per cent mortgages that had underpinned their own purchases) they generally faced 
substantial losses.
xci In addition to inflated prices, another contributory factor was the 
practice of `jerry building’ – building properties of low quality and trying to pass 
them off as higher quality houses. Developers faced few regulatory controls and their 
brochures sometimes included what one judge described as `specious statements 
designed to leave upon the mind of the reader the impression of… high quality’.
xcii  
Contemporary surveys indicate that a substantial proportion of new owner-occupied 
estates aimed at lower-income workers and sold on pool schemes were jerry-built and 
that purchasers often faced heavy and unexpected repair bills.
xciii This problem was 
tacitly acknowledged by the building society movement. As Frank Lee of the 
Borough Building Society noted: 
 
The jerry builder almost invariably relies on pool terms... The excessive 
depreciation… is a source of considerable worry to us.  It is strongly 
suspected that the… cash deposit towards the pool is extracted from the 
cost of the house and is immediately regarded in the main as being 
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Again, pool agreements with building societies were often emphasized in 
developers’ marketing as an endorsement of the builder’s construction standards. This 
practice was highlighted by the notorious Borders case (discussed below), the judge 
acknowledging the misleading impact of statements such as: `a 95 per cent mortgage 
advance… proves without a shadow of doubt, the amazing value of Morrell Homes… 
Each house is individually inspected by the Building Society surveyor during the 
course of construction, and again when the last coat of paint is finished.’
 xcv 
  Jerry-building often pushed purchasers into financial difficulties, as the move 
from tenancy to house purchase typically involved a substantial increase in the 
proportion of income devoted to accommodation, with little left over to meet 
unforeseen repair bills. While weekly payments were lower for a mortgaged house 
than an identical rented house, the vast majority of working-class house-buyers did 
not move from similar properties, but from much cheaper inner-urban 
accommodation. Building societies had a general `rule of thumb’ that a purchaser’s 
housing costs, including local rates, should not exceed a quarter of net household 
income – itself a much higher figure than the typical proportion devoted to 
accommodation by families in rented premises.
xcvi Yet contemporary sources 
indicated that many house-buyers devoted more than a quarter of their income to 
accommodation.
xcvii Analysis of 79 household budget summaries for non-agricultural 
working-class home-buyers, collected by the Ministry of Labour in April 1938, 
indicates that some 17.7 per cent allocated more than 25 per cent of household 
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premises, and rates), while 6.3 per cent allocated more than 30 per cent.
xcviii As the 
house purchases were typically made several years prior to the date of the budgets, the 
proportion committing more than 25 per cent of income to the mortgage at the time of 
purchase is likely to have been higher. 
Meanwhile additional costs associated with suburban living, such as higher 
transport costs and instalments on hire purchase furniture, often led families into a 
much greater financial commitment than they had anticipated when being told of the 
`affordable’ weekly mortgage instalments.
xcix This problem was recognised by the 
building society movement; as Walter Harvey of the Burnley Building told his 
industry colleagues, `we are taking on in increasing numbers the type of buyer-
borrower who is entering into obligations beyond his means… it is no real service to 
the house buyer to lend him more than he can afford to borrow.’
c Yet competitive 
pressures to gain developers’ business led societies into taking on many such 
customers. 
  Inflated prices, jerry building, and high weekly outlays, together resulted in an 
extremely high level of mortgage default (by post-1945 standards). Official data, 
based on returns to the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, showed a negligible 
default rate and were frequently cited by building societies as evidence of the healthy 
state of the market. However, these cover only mortgages over a year in arrears, or 
properties in the possession of the society for more than a year. Societies used a 
number of methods to massage the data, including using holding companies and 
receiverships to manage properties in possession, or using builders’ pool funds to 
reduce arrears to below 12 months. In 1933 the Halifax’s official return showed no 
properties in possession or mortgages in arrear for more than a year, yet at the 
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mortgage defaults as 1.10 per cent.
ci Fragmentary evidence for individual societies 
suggests that the average annual mortgage default rate was in the region of 1-2 per 
cent – implying a substantial likelihood of default for any particular mortgage over its 
typical 25 year term. Defaults were concentrated among pool-scheme clients and, 
therefore, among working and lower-middle class customers. For example, by the end 
of 1938 the Halifax recorded a rate of house sales following default of just under 9 per 
cent for mortgages introduced by its current builder-clients on pool schemes, 
indicating an annual default rate of about 2.5 per cent.
cii  
Builders had little incentive to minimise defaults by vetting customers so as to 
select only those who would be likely to be able to meet their mortgage commitments. 
Defaults lowered their collateral pool, but as collateral deposits were typically 
released only after about 10 years, they were more concerned with maximising 
turnover. Informed contemporaries believed that builders overcame the problem of 
tied-up pool funds by increasing selling prices by the value of pool deposits, thus 
effectively writing them off.
ciii
Purchasers in arrears often faced harsh treatment from their building society, 
despite promises of a sympathetic attitude to borrowers falling on hard times.
civ A. H. 
Holland, Chief Master, Chancery Division, reported to the Cabinet Committee on 
Building Societies that court cases coming before the Division revealed a harsh 
attitude to working people who had paid instalments fairly regularly for several years 
but got into arrears of £10-£20 through illness or unemployment. Such people, 
Holland noted, genuinely wanted to continue payments and only asked for sufficient 
time.
cv Holland claimed that pool agreements, by obliging the builder to buy back the 
property from the building society in the event of default, made societies keener to 
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example, following an industrial injury Grace Foakes and her husband ran into 
mortgage arrears and wrote to their building society, first asking for a postponement 
of their instalments and, later, offering to surrender the house, but received no reply. 
They returned the keys to the building society, but were later sued for the outstanding 
sum – a case the judge dismissed when he learned of the society’s conduct.
cvi  
  The late 1930s witnessed growing public disquiet regarding abuses in the 
house-building trade. For example, one of Britain’s leading builders, Norman Wates, 
stated that popular fears regarding Jerry building played a major role in tempering 
demand.
cvii These were highlighted by the Borders case and the accompanying 
`mortgages strikes’ on a number of estates around London. The history of this seminal 
episode in the history of the building society movement has already been told by 
McCulloch.
cviii Briefly, Mrs Borders, the wife of a London taxi driver, purchased a 
house on the Coney Hall Estate, West Wickham, Kent, in 1934. The mortgage was 
arranged with the Bradford Third Equitable Building Society, which had a pool 
arrangement with the developer Morrells. The house soon developed serious building 
defects, in common with many others on the estate. Mrs Borders claimed that 
Bradford Third Equitable was a party to various fraudulent claims in Morrells’ 
publicity material, and, crucially, that pool arrangements were ultra vires - as building 
societies had no legal authority to accept non-property collateral security. 
  The government was so alarmed at this case and its implications for the 
building society movement and building industry that a special Cabinet committee 
was convened, chaired by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham, and including Sir 
John Simon (Chancellor of Exchequer).
cix If was feared that if Mrs Borders won the 
case both the stability of the building society movement and the government’s policy 
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severe threat.
cx Furthermore, legal counsel indicated that Mrs Borders’ contention, 
that building societies’ making additional advances on non-property collateral was 
ultra vires, was almost certainly right in law. As Sir John Simon informed the 
Cabinet, such a judgement would invalidate a large proportion of mortgages, halt new 
house-building, produce heated political controversy, and, possibly, start a rush on 
building society deposits.
 cxi
  The building society movement pressed the government to introduce a bill to 
legalise both new pool advances and (retrospectively) existing advances.
cxii However, 
government investigation highlighted serious and widespread abuses of the pool 
system, which disadvantaged purchasers, undermined the long-term stability of the 
industry, and were generating growing political controversy.
cxiii It therefore 
introduced a compromise measure, the Building Societies Act 1939, which legalised 
pool arrangements but introduced a number of limited safeguards to protect 
purchasers. Their impact was never tested, as the Second World War halted new 
housing development and for several decades after 1945 building societies faced tight 
government restrictions on new mortgage business (as an instrument of monetary 




Prior to the First World War, British workers `were seen almost as a species 
apart, separated from the civilized section of the community not by their economic 
weakness, but by their entire way of life.’
cxiv By 1939 a significant proportion lived on 
modern, owner-occupied, housing estates, enjoying broadly similar lifestyles to the 
lower-ranks of the middle-class. Marketing campaigns stressing both the affordability 
  30of owner-occupation and the modern, aspirational, lifestyles that it offered, played a 
significant role in extending the limits of `consumer citizenship’ to this group.
cxv 
Evidence indicates that working-class families who moved into owner-occupation 
made substantial changes to their consumption patterns - with a redistribution of 
income from items of current consumption such as food, drink, fuel, and lighting, to 
durable items connected with conspicuous consumption, such as housing, furniture 
and clothing. They had also begun to adopt the modern pattern of the small, planned, 
family - having significantly fewer children, on average, than their counterparts in 
rented accommodation. The success of the building industry’s campaign to sell 
owner-occupation to the working-classes thus had a significance to British 
consumption patterns that went far beyond the rapid increase in owner-occupation and 
foreshadowed socio-economic changes that (interrupted by the Second World War 
and post-war austerity) were only to re-emerge in the 1950s. 
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